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Abstract 
The paper measures the tax compliance costs of business units that pay personal income tax in Croatia 
for the period 2001/2002. They comprise all taxes, except custom duties. 
The regressive effect is proven, measured by different size measures. In the cost structure the cost of 
time, predominantly the owner’s time, is predominant. Concerning the type of tax, personal income tax 
and VAT are, in aggregate, of almost the same importance. 
As a percentage of GDP the tax compliance costs come to around 0.8%. The share of personal income 
tax compliance costs in the relevant tax revenues is extremely high (almost 100%), which calls for the 
substitution of self-assessment by lump sum (estimated) tax. Psychological cost of that tax does not 
seem to be significant. The share of VAT is also considerable (25% or at least 16%), calling for a higher 
exemption threshold.  
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1. Introduction 
Taxation compliance costs have, in the last twenty-five years, been the subject of growing interest, 
especially in developed countries – on the part of both academics and governments. Still research of this 
kind is very rare among transition countries2, mostly because it requires complicated investigation 
involving the collection of large amounts of data not available from published sources, but also because 
there has been a tendency to neglect the problem.3 
This paper focuses on the tax compliance costs (of all taxes except customs and excise duties) of 
business units that pay personal income tax. Since the number of the employees does not exceed 50, 
they can be regarded as small businesses4. Furthermore, the average number of employees is one (1) 
and only 2.78% of them have more than five employees, so the research is effectively focused on micro 
entrepreneurs. 
We decided to undertake research to encompass (almost) all the taxes at the relevant (business) level in 
one questionnaire (as was presented for instance in Allers, 1994; Evans, Ritchie, Tran-Nam, Walpole 
19975; OECD, 2001 and in some way also in Sandford and Hasseldine, 19926, acc. to Hasseldine, 
1995). Furthermore, it is recognized (International Tax Compliance Costs Symposium) that it is difficult to 
state the compliance costs of each type of tax precisely. Even if it were possible, such a technique (the 
addition of the incremental compliance costs of different taxes) could underestimate the total compliance 
costs of business taxes (Sandford, 1995, p. 395-396). Businesses in our survey are asked about the 
compliance costs of all the taxes together7 and after that about the structure of all the costs concerning 
the different types of taxes (small business personal income tax, VAT, personal income taxes on wages 
and social security contributions).8  
As usually, compliance costs are defined as the costs incurred by taxpayers in meeting the requirements 
imposed on them by the law and the revenue authorities, over and above the actual payment of tax and 
over and above any distortion costs inherent in the nature of the tax (Sandford, 1995, p.1). They entail 
labour costs (owner, unpaid help, internal bookkeeper/accountant or other employee who handles taxes), 
external costs (bookkeeping/accounting office) as well as some other internal non-labour costs (software 
and hardware (additional), forms and stationary, postage and telephone, instructional literature and 
seminars, travelling costs, court costs). Tax planning is included as an inherent part of tax compliance 
costs. This research has not attempted to measure psychological costs directly (quantitatively), but only 
indirectly and concerning only personal income tax. No attempt has been made to distinguish “regular” 
                                                          
2 In Slovenia (Klun, 2002, 2004a, 2004b) this problem has been recognized and partially measured (but not concerning businesses 
that pay individual income tax – small business) as well as in Czech Republic (Vitek, Pavel, Pubal, 2003).  
3 The reasons for the lack of such research in Croatia are explained in Ott and Bajo, 2001, p. 230-235. 
4 Among the studies that are concentrated solely on small business /SMEs the Australian study (Small Business Deregulation Task 
Force, 1996; acc. to Turner, Smith and Gurd, 1998, p. 96) and the OECD study (OECD, 2001) should be mentioned. But both 
studies are broader and not concentrated exclusively on tax compliance costs and the latter one defines SMEs as having an upper 
limit of 500 employees. Another Australian study (Evans, Ritchie, Tran-Nam, Walpole 1997), although encompassing all business 
units, includes a special chapter dedicated to small business. The Collard, Godwin research (1999) for instance, also calculated 
compliance costs per employee for very small employers - with 1, 2 and 3 employees). Some VAT studies (synthesis in Bannock, 
2001) are concentrated exclusively on small business. 
5 And also in: Evans, Ritchie, Tran-Nam, Walpole, 1998 and Tran-Nam, Evans, Ritchie, Walpole, 2000. 
6 This research in effect grouped taxes in two questionnaires.  
7 Similarly as in OECD, 2001, but that study did not try to get the data about the tax structure of compliance costs. 
8 As opposite to the technique where taxpayers are asked concerning the different sorts of compliance costs (labor costs, external 
costs...) about the amount dedicated to each type of tax (with the ultimate addition of all the components). 
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and “initial” (“temporary” or “commencement”) costs9, not only because this would be extremely hard for 
the taxpayers, but also because tax changes are almost “regular” in Croatia. 
Due to the lack of relevant data, the cash-flow benefits and tax deductibility benefits are assessed only 
roughly or are even impossible to assess.  
The research has tried to test several hypotheses: 
• Small business tax compliance costs are regressive – the same pattern of regressivity that is 
internationally proven to be true for the entire range of businesses holds also for the subgroup of the 
business units that are personal income tax payers;  
• Taxpayers are not aware of what is meant by compliance costs; there is considerable accounting-
taxation overlap and this is negatively correlated with firm size; 
• Smaller business relies heavily on external professional accountants; as the size of business increases, 
they appear to spend proportionately more money expanding internal resources for tax compliance; 
• Labour costs are the most important part of the tax compliance costs; 
• VAT is responsible for the bulk of compliance costs; 
• The proportion of tax compliance costs in the relevant tax revenues is high. 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Survey and Sample 
The research was carried out by an interview survey. A postal survey was rejected after consultation with 
the other researchers and experts in Croatia, because of the very small response rate in Croatia. The 
commercial polling agency (PULS) that administered the interviews also strongly advocated interview 
survey, because of the very high postal costs in Croatia. Furthermore, interviews guarantee a better 
understanding of the stated questions and more reliable results. Unfortunately, they are, of course, more 
expensive. 
A couple of accounting offices, representative of “craft and trades” chamber and an accounting union 
were engaged as a consulting team (advisory committee) to correct the questionnaire and help us to test 
it on some relevant business units (“the pilot”)10. The questionnaire was accompanied by a covering letter 
explaining the necessity of the research and its benefit to taxpayers. Instructions for interviewers were 
added to the questionnaire and a seminar for them was held. 
The planned timing of the research (March-June 2002) was the best possible for the tax-filers to still 
remember their tax return data (the personal income tax returns for the previous year must be filed by the 
end of February together with the yearly VAT form). Unfortunately, the Tax Administration of Croatia was 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Something similar is employed in Collard and Godwin, 1999 (questionnaire in Appendix), where a checking question concerning 
“reported” compliance costs of only PAYE and National Insurance (entailing all the sorts of compliance costs) was put and after that 
its division concerning PAYE, NICs and SSP/SMP. 
9 Mostly due to the tax changes. 
10 The «pilot» confirmed our belief that taxpayers are not aware of what is meant by tax compliance costs and that itemizing them 
was the proper solution. It changed our first draft of the questionnaire in the way that some questions that had been originally for 
the owner were redirected (sometimes optionally) to the person who handles tax work (in some cases, of course, it could be owner 
too).  
 6 
overwhelmed with other duties and unable to supply us with the relevant population data11 (business 
units that pay personal income tax grouped according to their size measured in terms of number of 
employees12) and relevant addresses. Thus the interviews started at the end of April. Furthermore, the 
interview process was attended with a number of difficulties. The responding taxpayers complained that 
it had been very hard for them to assess the number of hours spent on tax matters, they were suspicious 
concerning the promised anonymity, complained that it took too long…13 The biggest problem for the 
interviewers in the cases where the entrepreneur had an accounting/bookkeeping office was to convince 
both sides to cooperate.14 Furthermore, often even inside the business more than one person had to be 
interviewed (owner and some other person who handles taxes). So, the interview process was prolonged 
and we ran into summer, which is well known to be the worst period for a survey. We paused in August, 
and prolonged in September and October. We exhausted all the addresses obtained as well as the time 
available and with great difficulty succeeded in obtaining 257 responses (0.25% of the total population). 
The structure of the sample according to the size (number of employees) and the structure of the total 
population of 103,451 businesses are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 Structure of sample and total population in terms of number of employees 
Number of employees  Sample (N) Sample (%) Total population in % 
0 84 33 59 
1-2 73 28 30 
3-5 40 16 8 
6 and more 60 23 3 
Total 257 100 100 (=103,451) 
The sample was weighted to reflect the population structure. Although not performed in the previous 
similar “synthetic” studies (for instance Allers, 1994; OECD, 2001) the sample was provisionally weighted 
also by the number of entrepreneurs that are exempt from VAT15, because their share in businesses that 
pay personal income tax is significant (36% in the total population) and not only concentrated in the first 
stratum only. In the sample they were underrepresented (only 15.5%) and it is obvious that being 
registered for or exempt from VAT substantially influences total tax compliance costs. 
Unlike for the size (number of employees) or VAT status, where there is logical positive relationship 
concerning tax compliance costs16, the sample was not weighted by sector of activity, because there was 
no positive relationship established.17 
                                                          
11 Although cooperation was initially agreed at the highest level, the data processing department of the Tax Administration, because 
of its load of duties, was unable to supply us with the all relevant information. We were also blamed for the official tax statistics 
being delayed because of our survey and finally the data processing department was forbidden to supply us with any additional 
data. As a result, only a rough estimation of cash-flow benefits and tax deductibility benefits was made. Furthermore, in order to get 
all the individual data, a complicated procedure was followed. Everything had to be written in details and processed from top to 
bottom. Since we were not able to communicate directly with the person handling the relevant data a lot of misunderstandings 
occurred. This took us a lot of time and made the research extremely difficult.  
12 Based on the 2001 data; the average number of employees per month was calculated (taking into account seasonal workers too) 
13 So the last questionnaire question concerning different taxes paid was dropped. 
14 Following the suggestions of the previous researchers (for instance Sandford, 1995, Gurd and Turner, 2001, p.80), we have 
decided that it would be impossible for the entrepreneur (or some of his employees) to assess the part of the external fees 
accounted for tax work (including its tax structure) as well as to answer some other qualitative tax compliance questions (the same 
was confirmed by our consulting team). So, we decided, in a case where an accounting/bookkeeping office is engaged, to put that 
question as well as other tax related questions to that office. 
15 In Croatia this is optional for entrepreneurs below the turnover threshold of 85,000 HRK in the previous year. 
16 The correlation results are presented in the third chapter (Results).  
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2.2. Measurement of tax compliance costs 
As noted in the introductory section, questions were put concerning different sorts of costs (time costs, 
other internal costs, external costs) for all taxes together (excluding customs) and after that the relevant 
persons were asked to state the structure of these costs (in percentages) concerning different types of 
taxes.  
In order to make it easier for the respondents they were asked about the relevant tax compliance costs 
for the last 12 months. The size data (number of employees) was also for the last 12 months.18 
In order to avoid any misunderstanding concerning tax compliance activities such as possible 
accounting-taxation overlaps typical for small business19 tax compliance activities were itemized.  
In valuing the time of the owner the respondent’s own valuation was chosen, as usually. As expected, 
since the value of working hour has a part of the “profit” as well as “gross” element in it (but also maybe 
because of the exaggeration), its average was double so high as the average wage per hour (including 
social security contributions). Hence an alternative valuation was performed too.  
There is no right way to place a value on an hour of unpaid help. We decided that it should in some way 
be connected to the owner (it is mostly spouse or some other family member), so the method applied by 
Allers (Allers, 1994, p.122) of valuing an hour of unpaid help at the half of the owner’s value of time was 
applied.  
The value of hour of an employee was measured according to Sandford’s suggestion (1995, p. 398), 
relating to not only “hourly wage rate”, but “the wage rate plus the proportion of whatever other costs (like 
payroll taxes or social security contributions) are attributable to the employee.” So, we asked about 
monthly gross wage (net wage plus taxes and plus employees’ social security contributions) of the 
employee who deals with taxes, and added the employer’s social security contributions. 
External fees for tax compliance work were calculated by asking the owner about the fee paid in the past 
12 months for the services of the accounting/bookkeeping office (which comprises other accounting work 
too) and then asking this external accountant/bookkeeper to estimate how much of the stated amount 
relates to the tax compliance work. It turned out that the average share of tax work in the fee was around 
32.42%. 
The biggest problem was other internal (non-labour) costs, often called “overheads”. There are several 
approaches to this problem: they range from excluding them altogether20, via adding “any other costs” 
that seem to capture mostly some non-regular or extraordinary costs21 to the inclusion of some22 or 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
17 This is maybe due to the sample being too small, but the result was also expected, because it is normal in Croatia to register for 
all the economic activities and later even not to concentrate only on one, but to perform other activities besides the «main one», 
even on a large scale. 
18 There is some imperfection here concerning the stratification and weighting (as well grossing up) which were done according to 
2001 data, but it was impossible to do it in a different way. 
19 This was measured implicitly by asking taxpayers what books and evidence they would keep if there were no taxes. 
20 For instance in Evans, et al., 1997; Sandford’s and Hasseldine’s questionnaire about GST and Business Income Tax in the 1992 
research. 
21 For instance Sandford’s et al. questionnaires in Administrative and Compliance Costs of Taxation, 1989; Pope’s questionnaire 
about company income tax from 1992. 
22 In general software and hardware – for instance OECD questionnaire, 2001 (but it seems that this survey failed to capture these 
costs properly). 
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(almost) all “overhead costs23. It is obvious that the development of technology changes the structure of 
tax compliance costs24, so it would seem unreasonable to exclude hardware and especially software 
costs. Also, some other “direct” costs that could be attributable to taxes could be included such as 
seminars, literature, forms…On the other hand, forcing taxpayers in general, especially small business, 
to estimate the “tax compliance costs” share of heating, lighting or office space seems too demanding. 
On the other hand, these costs are really “overheads” and they would be incurred even without taxes 
(this is especially true for the office space of small business). So, we decided to take some “intermediate 
approach”. We have rejected “pure” overhead costs such as office space, heating, lighting, which would 
mostly exist even without taxes. The same holds true even for hardware (computers) already bought and 
used for all other tasks inside the business. But if computer and especially software is bought mostly 
because / especially for tax work then the yearly depreciation (linear25) could be included. Other costs 
include software maintenance, stationery, forms, postage, telephone, seminar, travel costs, court 
(litigation) costs…We did not bother taxpayers with the detailed specification of all these costs one by 
one. Instead of that, we opted for one "catch-all" question concerning other internal non-labour costs 
giving a few examples of such costs. 
Since the distributions of the stratums were highly skewed, the median was chosen as the best measure 
of the average tax compliance costs.  
3. Results 
3.1. Total tax compliance costs per business and their regressivity 
The term “total” denotes the sum of the all tax compliance costs of a small business. They can be further 
divided according to type of taxes as well as type of costs. 
The median of total tax compliance cost by number of employees, taking into account also whether the 
business is registered for VAT or is exempt, is presented in the Table 2: 
Table 2 Average tax compliance costs (TCC) (median) by number of employees and VAT registration 
(in Croatian kunas (HRK)) 
Number of employees  TCC (all businesses) TCC (registered for VAT) TCC (exempt from VAT) 
0 8, 200.00 12,750.00 2,600.00 
1-2 17,642.55 20,015.96 10,450.00 
3-5 22,239.26 25,944.26 3,642.00* 
6 and more 48,000.00 48,000.00 - 
Total 10,800.00 17,919.00 4,100.00 
* Unreliable result, because of only 3 businesses in the stratum. 
It is obvious that, as expected, tax compliance costs rise with the rise in the size of business as 
measured by number of employees. There is a statistically significant relationship between the number of 
employees and total tax compliance costs at the significance level of 0.01. The relationship is medium 
                                                          
23 For instance Blumenthal’s and Slemrod’s questionnaire about compliance costs of U.S corporate income tax, 1992; Allers’s 
questionnaire from 1990; Collard and Godwin, 1999; UK compliance costs of VAT research from 2001, HM Customs and Excise, 
BMRB. 
24 It was normal in the seventies to conclude that internal costs besides the time spent are negligible (Sandford, 1981). 
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strong and positive (r = 0.203 (Pearson’s)) confirming that, as expected, as the number of employees 
rises, tax compliance costs rise also. 
There is also a statistically significant relationship between being registered for VAT and total tax 
compliance costs. The relationship is strong and positive (r = 0.442) at the significance level of 0.01. This 
confirms that businesses exempt from VAT have lower total tax compliance costs, as logically expected. 
The strong rise of compliance costs of all businesses in the second stratum (class) in comparison with 
the first stratum26 can be (partially) explained by a lot of businesses being exempt from VAT in the first 
stratum. We have deliberately analysed the median compliance costs by excluding these entrepreneurs 
and it can be seen that even inside the subgroup of businesses that are registered for VAT these 
amounts also rise.  
As expected from all previous research, total compliance costs proved to be regressive measured as 
costs per employee or as costs per head.27 The regressivity is measured as median of compliance costs 
per employee/head of each business in the stratum and for all businesses together. The results are 
presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 Tax compliance costs per employee and per head (median) 
Number of employees* TCC per employee (HRK) 
Number of employed 
persons (“heads”) 
TCC per head 
(HRK) 
1-2 12,894.47 1-2 10,000.00 
3-5 6,026.63 3-5 4,772.59 
6 and more 4,600.00 6 and more 2,693.81 
Total 10,254.52 Total 7,704.17 
* Stratum of zero (0) employees is, of course, excluded. 
As known from the literature the regressive effect of compliance costs is especially emphasized at the 
lower end of the size scale (it is slightly milder at the upper end of the scale). This is proven even here, 
where only three stratums are used and the last one wide open with the average number of employees 
even doubled. As already known, this regressive effect is the result of the fixed element inherent in 
compliance costs. It causes them to fall proportionally heavier on small firms, in our case the smallest of 
the small firms. The costs of firms with one and two employees are three times higher than those of firms 
with six and more employees.  
The regressivity was also tested using tax compliance costs as percentage of turnover. Since 
stratification and weighting as well as the whole analysis were done by number of employees, this 
analysis was also performed inside the stated stratums.28 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
25 In Croatia, there is a possibility for the immediate write-off for equipment. This amount would be inappropriate. 
26 As well as in the third one in comparison with the second one, but with a much lower intensity (number of firms exempt from VAT 
in the first stratum is 70 and in the second one only 19 (weighted)). 
27 We have followed the Allers' methodology of combining the calculation of tax compliance costs per employee with the tax 
compliance costs per head (Allers, 1994, p. 126-128). The term «heads», according to Allers, denotes the number of employees 
plus owner/manager or all employed persons (including owner (self employed)). In our calculations the employee stratums do not 
completely match with the «heads» stratums (+1) because business can have even two or more owners (in our case 14 
businesses had two co-entrepreneurs (partners) and one had three).  
28 See also OECD (2001, p. 52) for the same methodology. Nevertheless, proof about of regressivity could be also obtained by 
turnover size stratums. 
Turnover up to 85,000  85,001-500,000 500,000-1,000,000 >1,000,000 
TCC as % of turnover 0.1496 0.0922 0.0905 0.0216 
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Table 4 Total compliance costs as a percentage of turnover by firm size 
Number of employees  TCC (median) (HRK)  
Median turnover 
(HRK) 
TCC as percentage of 
turnover (median)* 
0 8, 200.00 56,000.00 0.13 
1-2 17,642.55 171,620.53 0.10 
3-5 22,239.26 369,982.84 0.08 
6 and more 48,000.00 1,560,000.00 0.04 
Total 10,800.00 85,000.00 0.11 
*Calculated again as median of TCC per turnover of each business in the stratum. 
As it can be seen, regressivity is proved again, but it is not as profound at the beginning of the scale as 
before. 
3.2. The structure of total tax compliance costs by type of costs 
Internal labour costs are the most important part of tax compliance costs, especially concerning small 
business. They are usually presented in hours. In calculating the average we wanted to get really 
representative values for businesses handling taxes and not just pure statistics, so we have taken into 
account only businesses where relevant persons exist / handle taxes.29  
Table 5 Time spent on tax compliance by different persons (hours) 
Number of 
employees  
% of 
businesses* 
where owner 
deals with taxes 
Average 
time 
spent by 
the owner 
(h) 
% of 
businesses 
having unpaid 
help with taxes 
Average 
time spend 
by unpaid 
helper(s) 
(h) 
% of 
businesses 
having 
internal 
accountant 
Average 
time spent 
by internal 
accountant 
(h) 
% or 
businesses 
having internal 
person dealing 
with taxes 
Average 
total 
time 
spent 
(h) 
0 97 139 40 93 7 290 99 240 
1-2 92 329 37 224 10 1280 96 565 
3-5 78 376 31 307 22 1552 85 875 
≥6  88 427 32 331 25 994 97 795 
Total 94 218 37 145 10 865 97 395 
* All businesses in relevant size stratum (class) = 100. 
First, it is clear that the hours of persons involved rise as the size of the business rises, which proves the 
validity of our research. The only exception from the trend is the internal accountant’s time for the last 
size class. The result can be partly explained by the fact that the smallest businesses have an employee, 
who handles accounting and tax work and is not especially trained for or even specialized in accounting 
and taxes. Businesses with more than six employees have more specialized persons as well as the 
“economies of scale” effect. 
It can be seen that the owner is almost always involved in tax matters30 and this is especially true of a 
sole proprietor. This “involvement” may range from doing all/part the tax work by himself or simply 
cooperating with others. It is obvious that concerning taxes the owner strongly cooperates with the other 
internal (as well as external persons). This cooperation is, as expected, especially pronounced when his 
or her spouse (or some other family member) runs the books (an unpaid helper). There is statistically 
                                                          
29 So, for instance when talking about the average time spent by an unpaid helper, only businesses that have unpaid helpers are 
taken into account. Otherwise we would end with a lot of zeroes with no meaningful results. 
Nevertheless, the full information about the meaning of the time costs of different subjects in the total compliance costs of the 
stratum as a whole can be obtained from the Table 5. 
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significant relationship between the time spent by the owner and the time spent by an unpaid helper (at 
the significance level of 0.01). The relationship is strong and positive (r = 0.308). 
We knew that a lot of small businesses use unpaid help, but did not expect the percentage to be so high. 
As expected, this percentage falls as the size rises, but not as steeply as we predicted (it even stagnates 
in the end). 
On the other hand, the percentage of businesses engaging an employee to handle tax work rises as the 
size rises, as expected. 
It will be suitable here for comparison reasons also to include an analysis of the percentage of 
businesses using external help in tax matters. The percentages in increasing size order are: 42%, 56%, 
77% and 53% with the average being 46%. It was expected that smaller businesses would rely more 
heavily on external help and that this pattern would be the opposite to that of the own employee 
(accountant) who handles taxes. There are two reasons why this is lower than expected in the first two 
size classes (stratums). The first one is the unpaid help, which is especially high for businesses without 
employees or with only one or two employees. The second one is the fact that VAT exempt businesses 
are predominantly in these size classes and these businesses tend to use external accounting offices 
less. There is a statistically significant relationship between being registered for VAT and using an 
external accounting office (at the significance level of 0.01). The relationship is medium strong and 
positive (r = 0.228), meaning that firms that are registered for VAT more often use an external accounting 
office than these that are exempt from VAT (not registered for VAT). 
A full picture of tax compliance costs structure can be seen from Table 6. 
Table 6 The structure of tax compliance costs by type 
Number of 
employees  Owner (%) 
Unpaid 
helper (%) 
Internal 
accountant (%) 
Other (non-labour) 
internal costs (%) 
Accounting 
office (%) Total (%) 
0 61.54 8.12 1.62 19.59 9.13 100.00 
1-2 66.20 6.08 9.74 10.51 7.48 100.00 
3-5 47.51 4.83 27.50 9.84 10.31 100.00 
≥6  48.55 6.37 17.70 15.55 11.88 100.00 
Total 60.52 6.94 8.34 15.28 8.89 100.00 
As expected, labour costs comprise the biggest part of the costs. Their costs structure reveals more or 
less the same picture as stated in the previous table, although it is not so clear. The percentage of other 
internal costs (non-labour internal costs) shows a U-shaped pattern being the highest for first and last 
size class31. 
The greatest puzzle is the share of accounting office costs, which is not completely in accordance with 
the share of businesses that engage an external accounting office. The reasons can be found in the 
relatively high external costs in comparison with the other costs in the first stratum, as well as the fees 
being often relatively the same or rising very slowly with the rise of enterprise size, which makes them 
profoundly regressive, especially at the beginning of the size scale. Furthermore, the share rises for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
30 When taking into account the compliance costs structure (by type of costs) of different types of taxes the share of owner's time 
costs is the greatest for personal income tax (around 10% higher then for VAT or wage taxes and social security contributions). 
31 These sorts of costs is known as hardest to measure, as already explained, so these results can be partly caused by the stated 
problems. 
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last stratum. Nevertheless, such a peculiar structure might be partly due to the imprecise assessment of 
the part of fees that relates to taxes. 
The predominant role of owner’s time deserves further attention. It is generally in accordance with the 
results of previous research, in which labour costs (also for smaller entrepreneurs) were presented in 
such detail (for instance Allers 1994; p.131; Sandford, Godwin, Hardwick, 1989, p. 116; Godwin, 1995, p. 
89; Evans et. al, 1997, p. 36-37). This is also influenced by the valuation method. As already mentioned, 
own valuations of time (per hour) were used and that influenced not only the owner’s share but also that 
one of the unpaid helper. The average hourly value of 81.5 HRK32 is more than double than the hourly 
cost of labour (gross wage + employer’s social security contributions) calculated on the basis of the 
average wage (36 HRK).33 Taking into account that the average wage is maybe too low to be the basis of 
an alternative calculation, the alternative calculation is done by halving the value of the owner’s time (and 
the unpaid helper’s time). The aggregate results at the level of the state are presented at the end of the 
paper. Concerning the structure, the influence is profound. The structure of total tax compliance costs 
changes to: 30.26% for owner, 3.47% for unpaid help, 16.98% for internal accountant, 31.12% for other 
internal costs (non-labour) and 18.11% for accounting office. 
3.3. Aggregate tax compliance costs in Croatia, composition by type of tax and share in 
tax revenues 
The aggregate tax compliance costs of business units that pay personal income tax (also called “social”34 
or “gross” tax compliance costs) in Croatia can be calculated using the classical gross-up method. Costs 
are calculated per size class and added together. The results are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7 Aggregate yearly compliance costs of small business in Croatia 2001/2002 and their structure by 
type of tax (in millions of HRK and in %) 
Number of 
employees  
TCC in Croatia 
for all taxes 
(mil. HRK) 
TCC of personal 
income tax* in Croatia  
(%) 
TCC of VAT 
in Croatia 
(%) 
TCC of wage tax and 
SSC**in Croatia 
(%) 
TCC of other 
taxes in Croatia 
(%) 
0 503.68 40.44 29.94 8.87 20.75 
1-2 550.84 27.00 26.88 31.81 14.31 
3-5 176.25 21.77 43.64 27.24 7.35 
≥6  138.24 23.35 38.49 26.94 11.22 
Total 1,369.00 31.39 (429.73)*** 
31.02 
(424.66)*** 
21.86 
(299.26)*** 
15.73 
(215.34)*** 
* Personal income tax of relevant small businesses. 
** Personal income tax, local surtax on wages and social security contributions. 
***Absolute numbers in millions. 
More than three quarters of tax compliance costs of businesses that pay personal income tax is borne by 
businesses with 0-2 employees. 
                                                          
32 It is interesting that this amount is almost constant over the size classes, opposite to the expectation that the smallest 
entrepreneurs (sole proprietors) could have lower values. 
33 In Croatia, there is no detailed wage statistics for different occupations like for instance NES in Great Britain, which would enable 
an alternative calculation of the value of an hour of work. There are data about the wages of different education levels, but they are 
published with two years time lag and relate only to net wages. The average wage statistics is the only current and reliable 
measure. 
34 As pointed out in Evans et al., 1997 and Tran-Nam et al., 2000; but without including managerial benefits to taxpayers, which 
were impossible to measure. 
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VAT is not in the first place in the cost structure by tax type; better to say it shares the “first place” with 
the personal income tax of entrepreneurs. The reason for this is the 36% of the population that is exempt 
from VAT. The costs structure of only VAT registered businesses has a different picture. As expected, 
VAT is now in first place (36.91%), followed by personal income tax (28.59%) and wage tax and social 
security contributions (22.03%). In the third class, where there are almost no VAT exempt traders, the 
share of VAT rises significantly. 
The high percentage of small business personal income tax is understandable, especially for the 
smallest entrepreneurs (with a lot of VAT exempt entrepreneurs and with almost no employees).35 
“Only” 22% for the compliance costs of wage tax and social security contributions connected with wages 
is not only caused by the fact that more than half of businesses have zero employees,36 and with the 
small number of employees in general. The relative low and stabile percentage for higher size classes as 
well as almost the same percentage for business units that pay corporate income tax estimated in other 
research37 confirms the stabile share range (20-30 percent) of these costs. 
Total aggregate tax compliance costs of business units that pay personal income tax are around 0.81% 
of GDP38, which is relatively high taking into consideration that there are also 71,780 business units that 
pay corporate income tax and that individual level taxes as well as customs and excise duties are not 
included.  
The average yearly revenue39of personal income tax of the relevant population is 437.02 millions HRK – 
just a little bit above the tax compliance costs figure (share of tax compliance cost of 98%!). Even the 
inclusion of tax deductibility benefits40 and cash-flow benefits (better to say costs)41 into “social” or 
“gross” compliance costs does not significantly alter this terrifying result. “Net” or “taxpayer” compliance 
costs are 413.50, which amounts to around 96.22%. As all the stated benefits/costs to the taxpayers 
offset costs/benefits to the tax authorities, the figure of the social costs of compliance is more relevant to 
be compared with the GDP and tax revenues. 
The fact that the “social” tax compliance costs of personal income tax of business units are as high as 
the revenues from that tax is not completely surprising. One of the reasons may be that the taxpayers 
exaggerated estimating the number of hours, but, on the other hand, it must be borne in mind that tax 
planning was included as the inherent part of tax compliance costs and it is especially important for 
                                                          
35 The share of personal income tax of a small business that is exempt from VAT is 46.14%, but as much as 55.32% for the sole 
proprietors. 
36 The existence of some compliance costs for this type of tax in this size class is caused by the fact that 0 employees is the result 
of the rounding down of 0.1-0.4 employees.  
37 The average for all companies is 25.34% and for the companies with more than 250 employees also «only» 22% (VAT is here 
responsible for the bulk of compliance costs). 
38 An alternative calculation , where the value of the owner's hour is halved (from the reasons already explained) with the resulting 
decrease of the value of unpaid help yields total aggregate tax compliance costs of 891 mil. HRK - 0.53% of GDP, which is still 
quite high and can be regarded as the lower boundary of tax compliance costs. Additional alternative calculations used mean on 
the original data (2,279.79 mi HRK) and data with halved hourly values for owner (1,544.90 mil. HRK) and can be regarded as 
upper boundaries, but these data are overrepresented, because of the already mentioned skeweness of distribution. 
39 2001 revenues plus 2002 revenues divided by 2, since the research encompasses the last 12 months (last half of the 2001 and 
first half of the 2002). 
40 Most of the costs (owner's time and unpaid help) cannot be deducted, which is a well known disadvantage of small business 
concerning compliance costs offsetting. Since the «average» business income (according to the Tax Administration data) is in the 
lowest tax bracket (15%), the tax deductions for all taxes can be roughly assessed at about 66.75 mil of HRK (unfortunately, the 
detailed breakdown of taxpayers according to their size and relevant marginal rates (or loss) was impossible to obtain). The amount 
that goes to the personal income tax is around 19.48 mil. HRK (calculated according to cost structure of personal income tax 
compliance costs; besides general structure, there are also structures for different types of taxes). 
41 Since most businesses have underpaid their personal income tax during the year (in monthly installments) the net cash flow cost 
is 3.25 mil HRK (calculated at 6.08% of short term bank interest rate for deposits). 
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personal income tax. Small business in Croatia is known to be very astute with respect to this aspect of 
taxation. Secondly, maybe an accounting/taxation overlap was present in some of the taxpayers, 
because all the income statement rules, including the relevant books that should be run, are an inherent 
part of personal income tax act only. In order to avoid this, tax compliance activities were itemized. 
Furthermore, the possibility of this overlap was tested also, asking taxpayers how they would behave, if 
there were no taxes. 55% of them answered that they would keep all the same books of accounts as 
they do at present (of course except tax evidence and statements), 31% said they would continue to 
keep some record, but simplified and only 9% said that they would not keep books of accounts at all. So, 
there is no profound taxation/accounting overlap and there is no relationship between these results and 
the size of the business. Thirdly, there is a possibility, as already stated, that taxpayers exaggerated the 
value of their hour.42 Finally, it is well known from the tax compliance literature that this ratio can be 
misleading and that the other side of the picture should be taken into account – the amount of revenues. 
Here, this amount is underrepresented, better to say underreported. This is well known fact in Croatia. 
Unofficially, taxpayers as well their accounting offices admit that the income statement should be fine 
tuned in a way to show some positive (in order to avoid an audit) but small income, and than “nobody is 
going to touch you”.43 The biggest part of the shadow economy in Croatia is in the sphere of small 
business, not only concerning personal income tax, but also wage taxes and social security contributions 
(Madžarević, 2002, p. 124-131). This is the strong argument in favour of a lump-sum tax (estimated tax) 
for businesses that pay personal income tax. This possibility exists in the Croatian Income Tax Act, but 
has never been put into practice.44 
Everything said above would imply the existence of a high psychological cost of personal income tax 
compliance. But, this is not the case. In answering the question “How did you feel after you had 
submitted your tax return?” as many as 43% of respondents claimed that they had been indifferent and 
only 16% of them admitted that had felt disturbed, because of a lot of pressure. 26% of them answered 
“Relieved, because I had competed this demanding and complex task” and 15% answered “Content, 
because I was able to do it without any difficulties”. 
The share of VAT social or gross compliance costs in the VAT revenues from businesses that pay 
personal income tax is around 24.33%.45 This is strong evidence supporting the well known fact about 
VAT burdening small business in particular and advocating the raising of the exemption threshold. The 
qualitative analysis also suggested this (Dimitrić, 2003). Although around half of the respondents 
considered the current threshold too low, there was, of course a statistically significant relationship 
between the size of the trader (measured by turnover) and the answer to the question. Smaller 
entrepreneurs tend to consider the registration threshold too low (Gamma = 0.267, p < 0.05). 
The inclusion of tax deductibility and cash-flow benefit does not alter the situation very much. Tax 
deductibility amounts to 22.93 million HRK and the cash-flow is impossible to measure. Although tax 
payments exceed tax refund entitlements, it is possible that cash flow costs exceeds cash flow benefits. 
                                                          
42 Alternative calculation based on the halved hourly value of owner still yields high percentage of 65% in relevant tax revenues. 
43 Of course, it should not be forgotten, that small entrepreneurs who are really in loss additionally contribute to the small amount of 
revenues from that tax. 
44 It is interesting to point out, that the results of the quantitative research of taxpayer compliance costs (what they claim to be more 
complicated and time spending, what would they suggest in order to simplify tax system and ease tax compliance...) have brought 
out the same conclusion (Dimitrić, 2003). 
45 Even with the alternative calculation (halved hourly value for owner) the share is still significant – 16%. 
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Most of the entrepreneurs, instead of claiming VAT refund, prolong this tax-free loan as the advance 
payment of future tax VAT liabilities. The reason for this is their fear of being audited when claiming a tax 
refund. Obviously the benefit of not being audited outweighs the cash-flow cost. That again, confirms our 
statements concerning the personal income tax of small business. 
Since there is no evidence about wage tax and social security contributions payable on and from wages 
separately for businesses that pay personal income tax, a rough assessment was made according to the 
number of employees in the analysed sector46. This share is around 5.8% (and 5.5% after inclusion of 
tax deductibility benefits)47. Again it is not the result of compliance costs being small48, but of the receipts 
of wage taxes and especially social security contributions being extremely high. 
4. Conclusion 
The regressive effect of tax compliance costs is proven in the case of Croatian small business 
(businesses that pay personal income tax), even with respect to micro businesses. In the cost structure 
the time cost, predominantly the owner’s time, is predominant. Concerning the type of tax, personal 
income tax and VAT are, in aggregate, of the almost same importance. 
The percentage of TCC of small business in GDP is around 0.8%, which is relatively high but not 
extremely so. The percentage of personal income tax compliance costs in the relevant tax revenues is 
extremely high (almost 100% or 65% under the alternative time valuation) which calls for substitution of 
self-assessment by lump sum tax (estimated tax). The percentage of VAT compliance costs is also 
considerable (25% or 16%) calling for a higher exemption threshold or higher three-month reporting 
threshold at least. The psychological costs seem to be low. 
The research turned out to be very arduous, long-lasting and complicated by institutional obstacles. The 
relevant business population had no experience with studies of that type and was reluctant to give some 
details, which contributed to the complexity of the research.  
                                                          
46 Since it is very common for all the employees in small business to be reported as receiving only the minimum wage, their share 
in income taxes on wages and social security contributions is probably even smaller, so the ultimate percentage is probably 
underestimated. 
47 There is no cash-flow benefit here, since as soon as wages are paid (monthly), personal income tax on wages and social 
security contributions are paid too. Tax deductibility benefit is only 15.30 mil. 
48 The results of qualitative analysis suggested that the taxpayers complained mostly concerning this field of tax compliance. 
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